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Abstract
This report presents and analyzes the fi ndings of a two-year fi eld research on local perceptions of social transformation in rural Nepal. In particular, it presents the fi ndings, and our interpretations of them, in a manner that can contribute not only to scholarly debate but, importantly, to current discussions on de-
velopment policy choices and on the role of aid agencies. One of the fi rst arguments that can be drawn from our 
fi eldwork is that, alongside political transition, there are clear evidence of a qualitative “step-change” in the way 
Nepali society is organized that is beyond the continual or “normal” processes of incremental change that are always 
at work. Field evidence clearly suggests that many existing social norms and patterns are being challenged and many 
are being reconstructed.
However, the fi eld evidence suggests that the political economy of survival in rural Nepal has not changed dra-
matically. There has been no revolution at the level of livelihoods. The poor remain poor, families receiving remit-
tances are better off, and, in some cases, can access land that traditional landlords have abandoned. An overall land 
reform remains a distant aspiration. However, the combination (and sometimes the competition) of the political 
agency of the Maoists and social development work of civil society organizations, in parallel with the development 
of formal and non-formal education, has resulted in a historical transformation of consciousness. Awareness of 
rights and gender has increased massively, the collective agency of women and oppressed and marginalized groups 
has escalated and has probably resulted in durable changes in how individuals, groups, and institutions interrelate. 
However, the “revolution,” such as it is, has yet to make a serious dent in the structural violence that continues to 
characterize life in rural Nepal.  
We found that rural Nepal is being increasingly incorporated into the market economy, as indicated by the 
commodifi cation of land, labor, and money. It remains to be seen whether the commodifi cation of key factors of 
production and the transformation that accompanies it will be benefi cial to the rural poor and marginalized groups 
in Nepal. We argue that the incorporation into the market economy of previously ungoverned spaces is likely to 
be fraught with tensions and ambiguities at the household, local, and national levels. Gramsci’s “interregnum” offers 
a useful framework to understand the current state of Nepal, i.e., caught between the known past and the uncer-
tain future of social organization, balancing the types and nature of traditional livelihoods, power relations, cultural 
norms, and values, while being propelled toward new constructs emerging from the transformation as it happens.
This study points to a rapidly emerging fl ashpoint here: if transformation in rural Nepal is more about the 
symbolic and the “awareness” aspects of social relationships and less about the structural dimensions of the human 
condition, the perceived disconnect between aspirations and reality is bound to escalate, with potentially serious 
consequences. Moreover, what we are starting to see is a growing disconnect between aspirations and realities. In the 
absence of structural changes in the lives and livelihoods of people on the ground, especially if the current stalemate 
continues at the central political level, this gap is likely to grow further.
Jeevan R. Sharma 
Antonio Donini
9 July 2010, Boston
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Introduction
This report presents and analyzes the fi ndings of research on local perceptions of social transfor-mation in rural Nepal.1 Based on fi eldwork in 
multiple sites in 2007-2009, it explores people’s percep-
tions and views on the nature and dynamics of social 
transformation and drivers of change during the con-
fl ict period and its immediate aftermath. Perceptions, 
of course, do not always match “reality.” What this re-
port explores is more about judgements and what local 
people considered meaningful to themselves, rather than 
established facts. 
The primary rationale for the study is the need to 
better understand the dynamics of change so that this 
knowledge can inform policy makers and national and 
international aid actors. In Nepal, as in all transition 
situations between armed confl ict and (hopefully) post-
confl ict recovery, the dynamics of social interaction and 
related tensions are complex and differ from region to 
region and even within different segments of the same 
communities. In the last decade, Nepal has undergone 
a series of complex and chaotic political transitions. 
Changes are taking place rapidly as we write. Thus, in 
this report, we attempt to come to grips with this com-
plexity and to present our fi ndings, and our interpreta-
tions of them, in a manner that can contribute not only 
to scholarly debate but, importantly, to current discus-
sions on development policy choices and on the role of 
aid agencies.
The Maoist insurgency was built around an agen-
da, which at its core attacked the feudal nature of Ne-
pali society and the structural inequalities inherent in 
it. Many of the transformative ideas were drawn from 
Mao’s “red book.” Whether this agenda was instrumen-
tal—a tool for overthrowing the Monarchy and captur-
ing power—or represented the aspiration for a profound 
social revolution is still an unanswered question, both at 
the Kathmandu level and in the remotest rural areas. It is 
not too early, however, to analyze social change resulting 
from the Maoist agenda and, more broadly, from com-
munities’ exposure to confl ict. The Maoists introduced, 
often forcibly, measures aimed at addressing centuries-
old, deeply-rooted forms of discrimination in Nepali 
rural society. Feudal structures, authority, and the caste 
system were challenged, parallel “people’s” structures of 
governance were introduced, and affi rmation of eth-
nic identity was encouraged. Perhaps more profoundly, 
women’s empowerment was promoted, both through 
the abolition of social practices (such as relegation dur-
ing menstruation and childbirth) and encouragement of 
women’s enrollment in the ranks of the People’s Libera-
tion Army (in which it is said that some 30 per cent of 
combatants were women) and in the Maoist governance 
structures.
After a decade of insurgency, a fragile peace was bro-
kered in 2006. The People’s Movement of 2006 (com-
monly known in Nepal as Jana Andolan II) against the 
direct rule by the King, growing pressure from the in-
ternational community, and an alliance between main-
stream political parties and the Maoists resulted in the 
signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
with the facilitation of India, in November 2006. Re-
fl ecting the sentiments of ethnic minorities and those 
who fought against the Hindu monarchy, the new gov-
ernment declared Nepal a secular state in 2006. Despite 
much controversy and postponement, Constituent As-
sembly (CA) elections were held in April 2008. Though 
none of the political parties won an outright majority 
in the election, the Maoists were the largest party, and 
in a position to lead a coalition government. An inter-
esting outcome of the elections was the emergence of 
regional parties that represent the grievances and aspi-
rations of the people of the Terai (lowlands bordering 
India). These parties bagged a signifi cant number of seats 
in the election and became key members of the govern-
ment coalition. Immediately after the elections, on 28 
May 2008, the new parliament declared Nepal a “federal 
democratic republic.” Nepal’s CA parliament was tasked 
to write a new constitution by 28 May 2010 represent-
ing the perceived grievances and wishes of one of the 
world’s most diverse and complex societies. At the time 
of writing this report, the political situation appeared 
to be extremely volatile and the constitution-drafting 
1 This report is a part of a larger research project at the Fein-
stein International Center (FIC), Tufts University that ex-
amines the relationship between aid, confl ict, and social 
transformation in Nepal. 
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surgency in Nepal. Only two scholars, Nickson (1992)3 
and Mikesell (1993)4 wrote about the potential for a 
Peruvian Shining Path-style Maoist uprising in Nepal. 
Interestingly, the Maoist insurgency and movement of 
landless peasants (Kamaiyas) have brought the issue of 
class and land distribution to the forefront. Though ini-
tially begun as a movement mobilizing peasants in rural 
Nepal, over the years the Maoists tacitly attracted sup-
port from other identity-based movements including 
those mobilizing Dalits (lower caste “untouchables”), 
minority ethnic groups, women, and other minority 
groups. In our study, we try to capture how local people 
perceive the nature and dynamics of social transforma-
tion in Nepali society. 
In this context, the study attempts to address the fol-
lowing questions:
• What is the nature of the social transformation in 
rural areas of contemporary post-confl ict Nepal? 
• Has the Maoist presence led to durable changes in 
issues of caste discrimination, empowerment, and 
gender and power relations, and perceptions of 
class?
• What are the other factors/drivers that account for 
change? How do factors such as migration, edu-
cation, media development, etc. interrelate with 
changes resulting from the Maoist agenda?
• What has been the role of external actors, including 
aid agencies and NGOs, in contributing (or not) to 
the processes of change? 
• What remains of the various forms of empowerment 
promoted or introduced by the Maoists?  Have the 
“feudal” structures and social norms re-established 
themselves?  
• Are there signifi cant disconnects between people’s 
perceptions of change and the reality on the ground? 
If so, how might we understand this? ■
process was stalled. None of the crucial institutional 
issues—nature of the federal state, reintegration of Mao-
ist combatants into the Nepali Army, demobilization of 
armed groups—had been resolved.
While it is possible to hold very different views 
on the current situation in Nepal, there is a general 
consensus that the country is undergoing a signifi cant 
“transition process” which has the potential to lead to 
a major “social transformation.” This evolving scenario 
of telescoped transformations presents a suitable case 
study to explore change as viewed from the perspec-
tive of local people in rural communities. While the 
macro perspectives on state reconstruction that inform 
much of the policy debate in Nepal are a useful guide, 
they do not provide meaningful insights into how such 
a process is perceived and felt at the local level. It is 
thus imperative to explore how different actors at the 
local level view and contribute to this transformation. 
An anthropological perspective, by its use of methods 
for capturing and recording “experience,” throws light 
both upon the perspectives of the people studied (“the 
actor’s perspective” or the “native point of view”) and 
upon broader social issues. 
The complexities and dynamics of gender, caste, 
and ethnic and power relations in Nepali society have 
been well documented by social scientists working in 
the region.2 In the post-1990 era, the public sphere in 
Nepal witnessed the emergence and rapid growth of 
various forms of caste, ethnicity, gender, and regional 
activisms, organizations, and movements. Parallel to 
these developments, this period also saw the growth in 
international aid and of the activities of NGOs work-
ing on a range of development and social issues. 
Compared to wider South Asia, the issue of class 
has been less debated academically or within the policy 
community in the Nepali context. In the absence of class 
analysis, there is no doubt that social scientists working 
in the region failed to see the possibility of a Maoist in-
3 Andrew R. Nickson, “Democratisation and the growth of 
communism in Nepal: A Peruvian scenario in the making,” 
in Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal, edited by 
Deepak Thapa (Kathmandu, Martin Chautari, 2003), 3-34.
4 Stephen L. Mikesell, “The Paradoxical support of Nepal’s 
left for Comrade Gonzalo,” in Understanding the Maoist 
Movement of Nepal, edited by Deepak Thapa (Kathmandu, 
Martin Chautari, 2003), 35-42.
2 L. Bennett, “Unequal Citizens. Gender, Caste and Ethnic 
Exclusion in Nepal” (Kathmandu, World Bank/DFID, Kath-
mandu, 2006). D. N. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, et al., eds., 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom (Netherlands, 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997). M. Lawoti, Towards 
a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a Multicul-
tural Society (New Delhi, London, and Thousand Oaks, Sage 
Publications, 2005). S. L. Mikesell, Class, State and Struggle in 
Nepal: Writings 1989-1995 (New Delhi, Manohar, 1999).
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Organization of the
Study and Methodology
Through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions at the community level, the fi eld research attempted to develop a composite 
picture of the drivers and the nature of change and learn 
signifi cant lessons on how individuals and communities 
“metabolize” such external drivers (be they the Maoists, 
schooling, education, migration, the work of NGOs and 
CBOs, government policies, new infrastructure, etc.). 
We are aware that interpreting the meanings of local 
perceptions is a diffi cult task since people’s views are not 
necessarily uniform across society on a range of sub-
jects. Our own role as researchers from particular back-
grounds does shape the inquiry and the interpretations. 
This approach has both strengths and limitations.
At the very outset, we must make it clear that while 
both authors carried out the interviews, Sharma con-
ducted most of the interviews. Sharma, a Nepali an-
thropologist, carried out interviews in Nepali. Donini, 
not a native Nepali, carried out interviews with the 
help of a local interpreter (often a student or an NGO 
worker). Although security concerns largely determined 
the choice of specifi c communities and respondents, 
we made a conscious effort to speak to community 
people from diverse socio-economic, age, gender, caste, 
and ethnic backgrounds. We sometimes consulted local 
NGOs or NGO workers, but we consciously avoided 
their company during the interviews. We introduced 
ourselves as researchers working for a university (and 
not representing NGOs or international agencies). We 
either walked or took hired local jeeps or public trans-
port to travel to the communities. 
The fi eldwork was carried out in June-July 2007, 
October-November 2007, March-April 2008, Septem-
ber-October 2008, March 2009, and June 2009. The re-
search was conducted in eight ethnographic sites in rural 
areas where we examined how local people experienced 
change, what was meaningful to them in what had hap-
pened in the past eight to ten years, and what they per-
ceived the drivers of change to be. In addition, we spoke 
to a few informants in peri-urban areas of Kathmandu 
and in small towns and bazaars in the Kathmandu valley. 
Furthermore, we had travelled to many other sites to 
carry out fi eldwork for other studies as a part of our re-
search on confl ict and transition issues (see next section 
for details on our work in Nepal). We conducted fi eld-
work in ethnographic sites representing different social 
and political contexts and made deliberate attempts to 
speak to people from different socio-economic, gender, 
caste, and ethnic backgrounds. In our attempt to present 
fi ndings, we carefully looked for patterns and themes in 
people’s views and drew our interpretation from these. 
Nevertheless, the fi ndings of this study and the compos-
ite picture that emerges from them must be read keep-
ing in mind the specifi c context: a situation where the 
peace process was still fragile and informants were care-
ful about what they said to whom. 
The choice of the research sites was driven by the re-
search questions mentioned above. Study areas included 
both Maoist strongholds and areas where Maoists were 
less infl uential; areas where NGOs had a thick presence 
and areas where NGOs were less present; areas that were 
more accessible by road and other basic services and ar-
eas that were less accessible; areas that saw ethnic mobi-
lization and areas that did not see much ethnic move-
ment. Geographically, the areas were spread across the 
middle hills and in the Terai. All areas were rural, some 
very remote, with the exception of a handful of inter-
views in the periphery of Kathmandu valley. The table 
in Annex I provides details of the fi eldwork areas. 
About 120 people (approximately 60% male and 40% 
female) were interviewed either individually or in small 
focus groups. Respondents were selected randomly. Typ-
ically, the researcher(s), accompanied by a local person, a 
student or an NGO worker from the area, would arrive 
in a village and try to meet with a wide range of people 
(from different socio-economic, caste, gender, ethnic-
ity, and age backgrounds). Many interviews were held 
in or outside villagers’ houses, in tea shops, or in the 
fi elds. Some were held in public places such as schools, 
health posts, or Village Development Centers (VDCs). 
No formal questionnaires were utilized, though we 
used a “grid” of issues and questions we were interested 
in. Conversations were allowed to develop organically 
starting from very general questions such as “What has 
changed in the village/in your life in the last fi ve to 
seven years?” This qualitative approach is basically the 
same as that utilized for earlier Tufts/FIC studies on lo-
cal perceptions, including in Nepal. ■
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mini-studies to young Nepali researchers on forms of 
protests, perceptions of everyday political violence in 
the Terai, mapping of international migrant recruitment 
agencies operations in Nepal, and ethnography of Ne-
pal-India cross-border fl ows. These are currently being 
written up.
In the coming years, we will continue to explore the 
nature of transformation and the restructuring of the 
Nepali state in the context of confl ict, aid, ethnic revival, 
migration, and global political and economic fl ows. Our 
research program aims to document how the “new Ne-
pal” is being constructed and understood by different 
actors and the Nepali population. 
In 2011, we plan to start a study on how Nepali mi-
grants contribute to transformation of gender, caste, eth-
nicity, and class identities at the personal and local levels 
and to the restructuring of the state in a still-turbulent 
post-confl ict environment. Through mapping the cur-
rent fl ows of Nepali migration in India, the Gulf, Ma-
laysia, and the United Kingdom, this project aims to 
understand migrants’ economic and socio-cultural im-
pact and the manner in which they support and infl u-
ence political developments in their homeland. Based 
on multi-sited fi eldwork, it will investigate the eco-
nomic and political life of migrants, how Nepali social 
networks, migrant organizations, and remittances con-
tribute to social transformation, at the precise moment 
when the Nepali state is going through a major process 
of reconstruction. ■
The present study is part of a wider set of research initiatives that Tufts/FIC is pursuing in Nepal. Starting with the case study on local perceptions 
of the work of humanitarian agencies conducted in 
20085 and with a report on Aid and Violence published 
in 2009,6 Tufts/FIC has become increasingly involved in 
research on confl ict and transition issues.
In 2009, Tufts/FIC undertook a fi eld-based study on 
youth participation and transformations in the Maoist 
organizations. This projects aims to understand transfor-
mations of young men and women within the Maoist 
party during the so-called “people’s war,” as well as the 
transformation of the Maoist party organizations, main-
ly the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Young 
Communist League (YCL), during the confl ict and 
post-confl ict period up to 2009. The research is based 
on interviews with members of PLA, YCL, and other 
party cadres. It focuses on how young men and women 
view their involvement in the insurgency. It attempts to 
understand the question of “becoming and being a man 
or a woman” in the Maoist insurgency. The key ques-
tions are: How did young people make decisions about 
joining the armed struggle? Why did some leave the vil-
lage to join the armed struggle while others stayed back? 
How do they view their involvement in the insurgency? 
How transformative was their participation in the insur-
gency? The writing up of this study is underway and it 
will be released later in 2010.
Moreover, in order to better understand various as-
pects of transition in Nepal, we have commissioned four 
5 Antonio Donini and Jeevan Raj Sharma, Nepal Case 
Study, Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, Power and 
Perceptions Research project, Feinstein International Cen-
ter, Tufts University, available at fi c.tufts.edu. This study was 
part of a series of 13 case studies exploring perceptions of 
the work of humanitarian agencies.  All are available at fi c.
tufts.edu.
6   Antonio Donini and Francesca Bonino, Aid and Violence: 
Development Policies and Confl ict in Nepal, Feinstein In-
ternational Center, Tufts University, Medford June 2009, 
available at fi c.tufts.edu.
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Background
This section presents the general background of the fi eldwork area. Perceptions are grouped the-matically under generic headings starting from 
the overall picture and the perceptions of key problems.
People’s perception
of major problems
Despite the excitement and enthusiasm around the 
electoral process, the structural realities of rural Nepal 
were very much on the mind of the people we inter-
viewed. The following paragraphs provide essential 
background information based on conversations in the 
fi eld, which is key to understanding people’s perceptions 
of social transformation in their communities. 
Unemployment
Unemployment was the most recurring problem 
mentioned by local people during interviews and group 
discussions. Young men (and a few women) felt that 
there were no employment opportunities for them and 
expressed their frustration. With the growth in numbers 
of youth who completed their schooling and degrees, 
there was a high aspiration for salaried employment 
among young people. However, they were faced with 
very limited opportunities and were increasingly con-
sidering to “fl ee” in search of work opportunities, i.e., 
to migrate. In the communities where they lived and 
among their peers, young men (and women) were un-
der intense pressure to fi nd employment and avoid be-
ing labelled as “berojar (unemployed)” or “faltu (useless).” 
Thus, unemployment had caused hardship in meeting 
the day-to-day needs of households. At the same time, 
it put tremendous pressure on young people to prove 
their worth. 
In many ways, access to modern schooling has 
impacted on the ideals of young men and increasing 
numbers of women. Schooling taught them to imagine 
the possibilities of modern forms of salaried employ-
ment but it was increasingly diffi cult for them to realize 
these goals. After completing their schooling, men and 
women did not want to be seen as working in the tra-
ditional occupations in the agrarian sector as this signi-
fi ed backwardness. The poor economic situation of the 
Nepali state meant that there were fewer employment 
opportunities and the competition for limited number 
of job opportunities was extremely high. Further, vio-
lent confl ict had discouraged the growth of the private 
sector and thus reduced the number of job opportuni-
ties. All this meant that the competition for employment 
within Nepal was very high and very few, those who 
had greater access to social, economic, and cultural capi-
tal, were successful. 
Therefore, the high aspirations to migration were 
shaped both by the lack of opportunities for employ-
ment and to avoid being labelled as “useless” in their 
communities. Despite being aware of the hardships in 
migration destinations (mainly Indian cities and the 
Gulf), young men both aspired and were under pressure 
to move in search for work.
Price increases
The signifi cant rise in prices of market goods in the 
recent years has meant that most of the households in 
the study areas found it extremely diffi cult to make ends 
meet. There were obvious signs that the poorer house-
holds had begun to cut expenditure on food, health, 
education of their children, and other household costs. 
Some people had begun to work longer hours and bor-
row money from local moneylenders and credit societ-
ies. It was obvious that such processes would have con-
siderable impact on the long-term well-being of people. 
Despite stiff increases in the prices of essential goods, the 
wage/earnings had remained more or less the same. The 
increasing dependence of households on market and 
consumer goods had directly affected their livelihoods 
security. There was no safety net or social protection 
available to these groups. 
Low wages
As indicated above, while the prices of goods had in-
creased, there was virtually no increase in wages. People 
we spoke to felt that they had very little say in negoti-
ating an increase in their wages. Furthermore, women 
and men were paid differently. For instance, in Morang, 
women day laborers were paid NRs 30 (plus snacks) 
while men were paid NRs 60-80 (plus snacks) per day. 
There was evidence that some laboring households were 
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living on a single meal a day. For example, Mushahars (an 
impoverished Terai Dalit group) interviewed in Morang 
ate one meal a day. 
Low wages have meant that the entire household, 
including in many cases school-age children who had 
dropped out of school, had started to work to earn live-
lihoods for the households. This meant that the laboring 
households were busy most of the time and were unable 
to access any services. They were often not reached by 
the development workers and NGOs. 
Neglect from the state
Almost all the people we spoke to in the communi-
ties had grievances against the state. There was a wide-
spread feeling of discontent among the local people and 
a sense of injustice. People felt that state had neglected 
them and their communities (people explained neglect 
in different terms including region, caste, ethnic group, 
and gender). Regardless of their socio-economic or 
cultural background, people in remote rural areas who 
lacked facilities and services felt that their region/area 
was neglected by the state. There was a feeling that most 
of the facilities, including roads, health services, and 
educational and employment opportunities, were cen-
tered in Kathmandu, other big cities, and in the Terai. 
Women in the fi eldwork areas felt that they had been 
discriminated against, which they said was obvious in 
their lower educational status and lack of representation 
in state administration and politics. Dalits and ethnic 
groups strongly felt that the Nepali state was dominated 
by high castes and had completely excluded them from 
the mainstream. 
The language that people used to talk about neglect 
came from the Maoists and NGOs. For instance, a mid-
dle-aged Dalit man in Rupandehi felt that, despite living 
in the same village since he was born, the state adminis-
tration had long denied giving him and his family citi-
zenship cards until very recently. Relatively better-off 
households throughout the fi eldwork areas complained 
that the state had failed to provide them adequate se-
curity and safety. High caste Bahuns, Chettris, landown-
ing Tharus, and migrants from the hills to the Terai (all 
slightly better-off groups) felt that “the time was against 
them” and complained that the state did not provide 
them with protection.
In fi eldwork areas, we met several people who had 
lost one or more family members during the confl ict. 
One middle-aged man in Dang who had lost his son 
and daughter-in-law spoke with anger and disgust 
against the state, the Maoists, and humanitarian/human 
rights agencies. He was critical of the Maoists for “tak-
ing away” his son and daughter-in-law to fi ght. They 
had died within a few months of joining the Maoists. 
He was very angry with the army for killing them. He 
felt that repeated visits by aid agencies that had asked 
him questions about his son and daughter-in-law had 
been painful. He was fed up with “human rights activ-
ists/development workers/humanitarian workers/other 
outsiders” who came to collect the same information 
again and again (“How did they die? How do you feel?” 
etc.) with little “empathetic support from them.” He 
said that he had been promised assistance many times 
but had received none. 
A Tamang shopkeeper in a village close to Kathman-
du recounted how he was “disappeared” by the state for 
eight months in an army base in 2003 and the anxiety 
faced by his family: “Nobody helped my family. They 
could neither turn to the state or to the Maoists for 
help.” He describes a climate of terror and abandonment 
in the village with his family caught between powerful 
forces over which it had no control.
Access to basic facilities
From the perspective of local communities, the 
state had failed in its role as provider of basic services. 
In many ways, neglect was mentioned in the form of 
limited access to basic facilities. The most basic services 
provided by the state, i.e., health and education, were of-
ten inaccessible to the most needy. While education was 
supposed to be free, there were associated costs, which 
made it diffi cult for families to send their children to 
school. Education beyond primary was considered ex-
tremely diffi cult as with increasing age it was diffi cult 
for the parents to meet the costs, and there were expec-
tations for boys and girls to mature early and become 
economically active to support their households. 
In Doti and Palpa, the lack of a secondary school 
in a nearby village meant that most of the households 
chose not to send their children beyond primary school. 
Sending children to the nearby town/city required re-
sources (social networks and money), which very few 
could afford. Better-off households had bought a house 
or rented a fl at in a nearby town in order to allow their 
children to go to secondary school. Health facilities were 
available but often lacked the basics (trained manpower 
and medicine). While the private sector had grown both 
in education and health, it was not affordable to most. In 
the absence of good health care at state facilities, peo-
ple often went to private clinics, which required them 
to borrow money or sell assets. In Doti, many women 
(wives of migrants) infected with HIV found it impos-
sible to travel to the district center to get Antiretroviral 
(ARV) treatment. After a two-hour walk, the fare of the 
public transport was NRs 160 to travel from the village 
to the district center. 
Lack of drinking water was considered a problem in 
most areas. Similarly, lack of proper irrigation was men-
tioned in Rupandehi and Morang. In a fi eldwork village 
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in Morang, there was a feeling that only the people with 
political infl uence benefi ted from irrigation schemes. 
Discrimination against women
Discrimination against women was a regular feature 
mentioned throughout the fi eldwork areas. Generally, 
women and men did acknowledge that discrimination 
against women (in the households, communities, and 
political structure) was a major issue, but women didn’t 
always mention this as the most important problem 
faced by them. It was obvious that women had become 
increasingly aware of the sense of discrimination against 
them in recent years. This awareness was very high 
among some women who had had access to schooling 
and those who took part in various social and political 
activities (NGO activities, meetings, etc.).
Despite the heightened sense of discrimination, 
women did not always feel comfortable talking about 
the discrimination they faced when they were alone 
with the interviewer. In meetings and group discus-
sions, however, women did speak openly, and often with 
a radical tone, about discrimination by the state, society, 
and within their households. Collective meetings/voice 
provided women with a space to speak about discrimi-
nation in public. 
Discrimination against Dalits
Not surprisingly, caste discrimination was considered 
a major issue by Dalits. Dalits throughout the study area 
felt that they were facing discrimination from the state 
as well as from local high caste people. There was a deep 
sense of exploitation, and an expectation that it would be 
reversed in the “New Nepal.” As discussed later in this 
paper, Dalits (and non-Dalits) felt that discrimination had 
decreased over the last ten years and there was a greater 
acknowledgment of the issue. In a village in Palpa, Dalits 
had abandoned the bali ghare system (providing various 
services including tailoring, iron work, etc. on bonded 
contract), which was considered exploitative. Similarly, 
the haliya (ploughing on a bonded contract) system was 
abandoned in Doti and Dadeldhura districts on the same 
grounds. The caste system was more relative than absolute, 
however: in a village in Rolpa we met a Dalit social activ-
ist working for an NGO who had changed his name so 
as not to be identifi able as a Dalit. He was able to do so 
because he was originally from another district. He felt 
that not being identifi ed as a Dalit made his advocacy 
against discrimination more effective.
Dalits felt that caste discrimination was still the most 
important issue for them, whereas many non-Dalits 
felt that things had changed in the last 15-20 years and 
people no longer discriminated on the basis of caste. In 
the Terai, one often heard comments from upper caste 
people: “There is no discrimination here, Dalits can go 
to the temple or to the school” (even if newspaper ar-
ticles often confi rmed the contrary).
Security/fear and law and order
Security and fear remained an important issue for 
many people in the fi eldwork areas. While there was a 
general agreement that the overall physical security situ-
ation had improved considerably in the last few years, 
there were new kinds of security concerns. People still 
felt intimidated by the Maoists in several areas. Similarly, 
migrants from the hills (Pahadis) often lived in fear in the 
Terai. There was a sense of helplessness among people 
who had traditionally supported the Monarchy that the 
state was not there to provide any form of protection. 
People felt that the law and order situation had become 
worse and many found it very diffi cult to cope with this. 
The police and administration were not listening to the 
complaints against the Maoists, the YCL, and the state 
security forces. “These days the situation is not good, 
you have to be extremely careful,” commented a Chettri 
teacher in Doti. In a village in Kailali, close to the Indian 
border, people mentioned that there had been an in-
crease in crime in recent months as Indian dacoits (crim-
inals) came and looted their property. Local people took 
extra care and protection to ensure their own security 
and did not have faith in the police or administration to 
provide them with security and justice.
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Landlessness
Landlessness or near landlessness remained a major 
issue in all the fi eldwork areas. People who were landless 
or only had very small land holdings felt that they were 
not being listened to by the state. These people squatted 
on a small piece of land but worked in someone else’s 
land on a share-cropping or contract basis. Very gener-
ally speaking, there were more landless households in 
the Terai than in the hills. In the Terai (in Morang, Ru-
pandehi, Kailali, and Dang), there were many absentee 
landlords who lived in the nearby cities but gave their 
land to village households on a share-cropping or con-
tract basis. The situation was different in the hills where, 
although most families owned some land, productive 
land was rarely available and lack of productivity of land 
was considered a major problem. 
There has been a move towards more mechanized 
farming with the introduction of tractors, which has re-
duced the demand for agricultural labor in the Terai. 
The surplus labor was now displaced to work as wage 
laborers in the construction and service sectors in small 
towns and cities. All these changes are indicative of an 
accelerated integration of rural Nepal into larger eco-
nomic processes and of the commodifi cation of land 
and labor. 
Changing livelihoods
All the households in the fi eldwork areas were en-
gaged in multiple economic activities. People identifi ed 
themselves as subsistence farmers in the sense that they 
produced mostly for consumption and not for trade. 
Apart from their engagement in managing their farms 
or in share-cropping, the most obvious source of in-
come for poorer households was daily wage labor. Given 
the demand for fresh vegetables in towns, a few farming 
households had begun to experiment with vegetables 
(caulifl ower, tomato, modern hybrid beans, modern cu-
cumber, etc.) in their fi elds. Dairy cooperatives had been 
introduced in the villages, serving as a form of cash in-
come for the households that sold milk. 
There was a general move towards growing cash crops 
(including growing vegetables to sell in nearby markets) 
and engagement in small-scale livestock enterprises like 
rearing goats, chicken, or buffaloes. Agricultural pro-
grams introduced by the Nepali state in partnership 
with aid agencies and NGOs had led to transformation 
in agricultural practices. Small towns had shops that sold 
modern fertilizers, pesticides, and hybrid seeds. Employ-
ment outside the village, both long and short distance, 
was becoming more common for most of the house-
Woman carry fodder in a “doko” in a village in Rolpa
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holds. While farming and agrarian labor remain key as-
pects of people’s livelihoods, migration and expansion 
of the market have emerged as major sources of people’s 
livelihoods. This signals the massive incorporation of hill 
economy in the wider economic fl ows.
Migration
Migration to work in Indian cities (Delhi, Mumbai, 
Bangalore, Punjab) was a popular practice among men 
in villages in Doti, Dadelhura, Kailali, Dang, and Palpa. 
Poorer households in Terai villages in Kailali, Rupan-
dehi, Dang, and Morang went to India on a short-term 
basis as agricultural laborers. Though migration to India 
was the least desired form of migration because of low 
pay and diffi cult working/living conditions, it was con-
sidered better than working as an agricultural laborer 
in the village. Despite exploitation, migration to Indian 
cities did enable men to remit money to support their 
households and occasionally provided them with op-
portunities for consumption of goods and experiences.7 
It is likely that remittance fl ows in the villages had func-
tioned as a safety net for households of migrants and 
helped to cope with the rising food prices. A few wom-
en went with their husbands or relatives to fi nd work 
in India. In the recent years, an increasing number of 
women out-migrated on their own within and outside 
of Nepal, mainly to India and the Gulf. 
Migration to the Gulf and particularly to Qatar had 
emerged as a more desired form of migration among 
many young men and women. Gulf migration was very 
common in Palpa and was increasingly becoming com-
mon in Rupandehi, Dang, and Morang. Only a few men 
from Doti and Kailali went to the Gulf. A few women 
from Palpa had gone to the Gulf. However, the high 
level of investment (agency fees and air travel) required 
for migration to the Gulf meant that not everybody 
who aspired was able to go. Gulf migration was popular 
among the households who could manage to accumu-
late, on their own or by taking a loan, a large sum of 
money (around NRs 70,000-80,000) to go abroad. 
Throughout the fi eldwork areas, migration to Kath-
mandu and other major cities within Nepal was com-
mon among high caste people who had the educational 
qualifi cations and social networks to look for jobs in the 
cities. In the last fi ve to seven years, increasing numbers 
of women with educational qualifi cations, mostly high 
caste, were migrating to the nearby towns and cities like 
Kathmandu in search of job opportunities. 
Expansion of the market economy
The growth of the market economy, the expansion 
of road networks and the growth of the service sector 
in recent years had opened new work opportunities. A 
few people, including wives of migrants and widows, 
had opened small shops, hotels, or bars (bhattis) on the 
sides of the newly-built roads. Some young men went 
to work as helpers in public transport (bus and jeeps), 
which had considerably increased in the recent years.
A larger number of households received remittances 
from their family members working in different loca-
tions within and outside Nepal. Despite this, people in 
the villages identifi ed farming as their primary occupa-
tion. It was not necessary for the households to depend 
on agriculture to identify themselves as farmers. Farming 
provided a partial means of livelihoods for households, 
who continued to engage in farming, though it played a 
less signifi cant role in their day-to-day living. The very 
identifi cation of themselves as people from the village 
meant that they introduced themselves as farmers. 
Presence of the Maoists
Maoists were present throughout the fi eldwork areas. 
It was very common to fi nd people who happily intro-
duced themselves as Maoists (Maobadi) or as members 
of the YCL. However, the degree of presence varied. In 
all the areas, it was common to see the physical presence 
of the Maoists, i.e., a Maoist party offi ce, Maoist activ-
ists moving around the village or organizing different 
activities. Similarly, Maoists had a strong psychological 
presence, i.e., people often thought of or considered the 
Maoists’ position on a particular issue and their possible 
reactions before doing anything. In this sense, people’s 
choices were mediated by the potential reactions from 
the Maoists. 
While we did not see any armed presence of the 
Maoists, people in all the areas believed that Maoists 
often carried weapons. At the same time, there was a 
strong political presence of the Maoists in all the areas. 
Signalling the infl uence of the Maoists, people often 
referred to particular areas/villages as “the Maoist vil-
lage.”
In general, the Maoists appeared to be popular and 
most people in the fi eldwork areas accepted them as a 
strong political force, although people did not always 
agree with their tactics. A few people did not trust the 
Maoists as political actors and were sceptical of their 
activities. Their presence was comparatively thinner in 
7  The fi ndings from this fi eldwork confi rm Jeevan Raj Shar-
ma’s doctoral research fi ndings. See: J. R. Sharma, “Mobility, 
Pathology and Livelihoods: an ethnography of forms of mo-
bility in/from Nepal” (Graduate School of Social and Po-
litical Studies, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 2007). 
J. R. Sharma, “Practices of Male Labor Migration from the 
Hills of Nepal to India in Development Discourses: Which 
Pathology?” Gender, Technology and Development 12, no. 3 
(2008): 303-323.
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had opened opportunities for full-employment (based 
on monthly salary) or some other benefi ts (allowances 
for participating in meetings, assisting in surveys, etc.). 
All the NGOs and CBOs had a strong element of 
people’s participation and community organization in 
their programs. NGO work was mainly focussed around 
“capacity building,” “social mobilization,” and “aware-
ness-raising.” The usual methods of most of the NGOs 
included community organization, relationship build-
ing, forming groups of benefi ciaries (women, Dalits, or 
general community people), conducting regular meet-
ings, running training programs, taking a few individu-
als on educational trips (exposure visits), and recruiting 
some of the local people as community mobilizers, peer 
educators, or outreach educators. NGO activities and 
facilities were often most visible and attractive and tend-
ed to undermine state facilities/services. NGO workers 
were visible conducting meetings/home visits and other 
activities. NGOs had provided a few local people with 
jobs as social mobilizers and outreach workers. Saving 
and credit schemes were common throughout the fi eld-
work areas. 
Several people gave credit to NGOs for bringing 
some important changes in their communities. These 
people compared the work of NGOs with government 
initiatives and considered the latter ineffective and inef-
fi cient. Generally speaking, a larger number of people 
believed that NGOs (commonly referred to as NGOs, 
sanstha or organizations, pariyojana or project, or the 
name of the project) had supported their community. 
However, the same participants were quick to provide 
very critical assessments of these same NGOs, which ac-
cording to them didn’t do good work and were there to 
make money. In this sense, people maintained an ambiv-
alent attitude towards NGOs. The NGOs we spoke to 
viewed themselves as agents of change. In this, they were 
similar to the Maoists, more in terms of the issues raised 
than in the methods employed. As we shall see below, 
the latent competition between these two approaches 
was both a source of tension and of synergies. ■
the fi eldwork area in Morang, whereas they had thick 
presence in Rolpa, Dang, Palpa, Rupandehi, Doti, and 
Kailali. 
Young men (and a few women) had become attract-
ed to the Maoist cause and joined their organizations. 
These young men and women often introduced them-
selves as YCL. “We are all YCL, you will only fi nd YCLs 
here,” commented a group of Dalit men whom we met 
in Doti. A large number of Dalit men had become YCL 
in Doti and in Palpa. Many Bahun older teenagers in-
troduced themselves as YCL in Palpa. It was obvious 
that young unemployed men were the most important 
source of supporters for the Maoists.
Generally, the Maoists had established themselves as 
a strong, militarized, political force in the local com-
munities. Thus, people who were not sympathetic to the 
Maoists preferred to keep quiet and did not make any 
comments about them. We were able to observe a threat 
issued by a local Maoist activist to a group of communi-
ty people in Palpa. The young Maoist activist was issuing 
a threat to all present not to attempt erasing the Maoist 
slogans on the local community hall. He raised his fi nger 
in front of everybody and said, “Or else....”
There were rumors that many community people 
who were activists for other political parties had joined 
the Maoists in recent months. Local people called them 
“opportunists” and made comments that these people 
were after the money. 
NGOs and community 
organization/development 
activities
NGOs and CBOs were present throughout the fi eld-
work areas. During the last decade, there has been a mas-
sive growth of small community-based organizations as 
well as of the presence of local, national, and interna-
tional NGOs in the villages. People were very conscious 
of this growth, as it had impacted their life directly. For 
a few educated people, the growth of NGO activities 
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Dynamics of Change
and Social Transformation
All the people who took part in the study felt that things had changed considerably in their com-munities in the past 10-12 years. Referring to 
the recent political changes and the elections, a middle-
aged woman in Doti said, “Everywhere there is change. 
Everything is new these days, isn’t it? Old days are gone 
(laughs).” People often used the term samajik pariwartan 
(social change) to talk about the changes and transfor-
mation seen in their communities. People gave various 
examples of “step-changes” that had taken place in their 
villages and communities. Generally speaking, people 
frequently referred to improvements or positive changes 
(ramro kura or sakaratmak pariwartan) that often included: 
heightened confi dence and awareness of people’s rights; 
impressive changes in women’s participation, education, 
and status; reduced caste-based discrimination; opportu-
nities for schooling and employment; growth of market, 
roads, facilities, and services, among others. Very rarely 
people spoke of what they called negative changes (na-
karatmak pariwartan) that had taken place during the con-
fl ict years. These included: use of violence to get things 
done; increase in prices of goods; growth in anarchic 
activities; lack of protection and safety; and undermin-
ing of traditional values and spiritual culture and lack of 
discipline. 
In the following paragraphs, we present the percep-
tions of the nature of the transformations that have taken 
place in rural Nepal and the drivers of social transforma-
tions, drawing on our interviews and discussions with 
local people. We discuss people’s perceptions in three 
arenas: caste, women’s position, and economic relations. 
Although the choice of these three variables is based 
on the issues people raised during our fi eldwork, they 
nonetheless refl ect the major patterns of inequalities 
and structural violence in Nepal. This report does not 
discuss the issue of ethnic identity, not because it does 
not represent an important dimension of inequality in 
Nepal, which has been statistically proven and remains 
the central focus of politics of representation in Nepal, 
but because the local people we interacted did not raise 
the issue of ethnic representation. 
After presenting what was meaningful to people in 
terms of nature and drivers of change, we attempt an 
analysis of the wider meaning of these perceptions and 
what they tell us about the nature and drivers of social 
transformation more generally. 
Caste 
“Earlier, people used to call us ‘Damai’ (tailor) and 
looked down at us and spoke to us in an authoritative 
voice (hepera), these days they call us ‘Dalit.’ It is differ-
ent. Their language has become softer, at least in public.” 
Perhaps what this middle-aged Dalit woman in Palpa 
said best refl ects the nature of transformation in caste 
relations in contemporary rural Nepal. There have been 
visible and signifi cant changes in the caste domain, in-
cluding increased agency of Dalits and a proliferation of 
Dalit identity movements at the local level. Social mo-
bility among Dalits had increased and there was a sig-
nifi cant reduction in caste-based discrimination.
A Dalit activist who ran a local NGO in Doti and 
Dadeldhura said that it was diffi cult to change the at-
titude of people, especially older Dalits and non-Dalits. 
He said, “It is easy to educate people who are ignorant 
about something but it is very diffi cult to work with 
people who already know.” 
One of the most signifi cant changes has been the 
growth in schooling practices among Dalits. Dalits saw 
education as a route to social mobility. Citing the ex-
amples of successful Dalits who completed their school-
ing and found salaried employment, several Dalits em-
phasized that it was the lack of education that put them 
at a disadvantage. In recent years, we were told, several 
Dalit men and women had completed their studies and 
had been recruited by NGOs, the civil service, and the 
private sector in the cities. In many villages, we saw Dalit 
families who clearly valued education and felt empow-
ered by it. Often these families seemed to be more self-
assured and upwardly mobile than impoverished upper-
caste families.
Very generally speaking, people (Dalits and non-Dal-
its/women and men) agreed that both formal and infor-
mal education had played an important role in bringing 
about this transformation. The growth in schooling and 
participation in various forms of non-formal education 
classes run by the state or NGOs had made people aware 
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of confi dence and self-esteem to speak against injus-
tice in their “community.” They had begun to speak for 
themselves and build networks. Dalit mobilization with 
the support of NGOs had reached village households in 
all the areas, but was weaker in the Terai. For example, 
this was refl ected in the situation of Mushahars (a very 
impoverished Terai Dalit group) in Morang who were 
hardly organized.
Unlike previously, Dalits came out openly to partici-
pate in different community activities, in local commit-
tees and local political issues. In all community affairs, 
there was a Dalit quota and educated Dalit men and 
women made efforts to ensure that it was maintained. 
In all the local institutions, including schools and health 
posts, there was Dalit representation and NGO support 
often played an instrumental role in this.
In Rupandehi, men (young and middle-aged) from 
lower caste backgrounds often greeted outsiders with lal 
salam (red salute) and said that Maoists had done a great 
job by providing them with their “citizenship card” that 
had been denied to them previously by the state, which 
claimed they were recent migrants from India. It was 
very clear that the support for the Maoist party had 
come largely from young men and women in the vil-
lages and overwhelmingly from Dalits. A Dalit middle-
aged man in Rupandehi told me he had been denied a 
citizenship card until very recently. He felt that because 
of his background (i.e., a harijan, or untouchable, from 
the Terai) he had been denied his right to citizenship. He 
felt that the Maoists had provided them with citizenship 
and justice (nyaya). 
Sense of equality and respect
As indicated at the beginning of this section, Dalits 
felt that they were no longer treated with disrespect but 
were addressed by their name. A Dalit activist in Doti 
said, “Previously if they (high caste) wanted to talk to 
us, they would call us and we went to their place. Now 
they come to where we are. Earlier, they would say: ‘Ooh 
Rame, come here’ and I would simply go (Ye, rame, yeta 
aaija ta ani ma khuru khuru janthe). Now, they come to me 
and say: ‘Hello Ram brother or Mr. Ram, I wanted to 
talk to you about something’ (Oho ram bhai or ram ji, euta 
sallah garnu parne thiyo). I must say this is a big change, 
isn’t it.” Evidence from other areas confi rmed this form 
of “step-change.” In Palpa, Dalit men and women said 
that they were addressed by their name with respect and 
there was no use of abusive or discriminatory language. 
A Dalit woman commented, “They call us by name and 
treat us with respect in front; I don’t know what they do 
behind our back.” High caste men and women said that 
they used respectful language while speaking to Dalits. A 
man in Doti said, “These days if we show a little bit of 
carelessness, they will create fi re. We have to be extremely 
careful. Maybe our fathers and grandfathers treated them 
(chetna) and was considered a very important vector of 
transformation. NGOs that worked on social inclusion 
issues were given credit for organizing community peo-
ple with a caste focus. This had played a central role in 
organizing Dalit consciousness. 
Dalits and non-Dalits alike felt that the Maoists had 
provided important political support to bring about 
changes in their position in society. Maoists were often 
given credit for providing justice to Dalits when there 
were instances of caste-based discrimination in local 
communities. High caste people who did not support 
the Maoists felt that the Dalits had become very power-
ful in the villages with the support of Maoists. 
Increased political agency of Dalits
In the study areas, frequently participants used the 
term Dalit, which literally means “the oppressed” to re-
fer to people from lower castes. The word is adopted 
from the Dalit movement in India. It is used to symbol-
ize a common identity of all the “untouchable” caste 
groups into a single one so that they can collectively 
reject the hierarchically organized ritual pollution and 
injustice embedded in the caste system. 
There was a high level of consciousness among Dal-
its of their social position. A new sense of Dalit identity 
was visible. People now identifi ed themselves as Dalits, 
and not necessarily their occupational names like Damai, 
Kami, Sarki, and Gaine, among others. In the focus group 
discussions, both men and women introduced themselves 
with their full name and added “Dalit bata” (meaning 
from the oppressed caste group). The increase in public 
meetings in the villages, often organized by NGOs or 
CBOs, had meant that the formal practice of introducing 
participants had expanded, and such meetings provided 
a space to assert Dalit identity. Everybody present in the 
meeting introduced themselves with their name. The 
new Dalit identity had provided a space for organizing 
into local groups and building coalitions and networks.
Caste-based discrimination had become a signifi -
cant and sensitive public issue in the communities and 
attracted a considerable interest among people. It was 
obvious that society had become more political and it 
had become easier for Dalits to confront non-Dalits. 
Referring to the upper caste in his village, a young man 
in Dang said, “The situation is not like before, now we 
don’t keep quiet.” Dalits felt that the activities of the 
Maoists had provided them with a space to enjoy their 
rights. “Whatever we may say about the Maoists, they did 
raise our issue,” said a Dalit woman in Palpa. As woman 
in Dang put it, “The Maoists say we are all equal; there 
are only two castes: man and woman.” Dalits felt that 
the changing political context and the popularity of the 
Maoists had provided them with a space to enjoy their 
rights. Young Dalit men and women had a high degree 
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with less respect, I don’t think we do that.” He felt that 
now people had become “aware” that all are equal and 
attributed this change to education. Referring to the 
“new political climate” in favor of “lower caste popula-
tion,” Dalit men opined that it was almost impossible for 
people from high caste to treat them with disrespect. 
However, stereotypes live on. An upper caste teacher 
in the Terai said: “Dalits can now go to the temple, but 
they don’t know how to pray.”
Change is not linear. In Chaimale, in the hills above 
Kathmandu, a middle-aged woman, asked about what 
had changed in the village, explained that people were 
now much more aware and there was less discrimina-
tion. When asked what she attributed the change to, she 
hesitated. A young man who was listening to the con-
versation chipped in: “Tell them, tell them that it was 
the Maoists who brought the change!” Two things trans-
pired that are emblematic of the kind of transformation 
that Nepal is going through: the young man was a sol-
dier on leave in the village who had fought the Maoists 
for several years; the lady was the daughter-in-law of the 
local Maoist leader, a very strict caste-abiding Brahmin 
who does not let Dalits into his house nor shares food 
with them.
Decreased discriminatory practices
Dalits throughout the fi eldwork areas felt that they 
had been historically discriminated against and main-
tained the belief that high castes had exploited them. 
There was a strong sense of resentment against high 
caste people. 
As already noted, there was a common perception, 
among both high caste and lower caste, that caste-based 
discrimination had decreased signifi cantly in the last 10-
12 years. Very generally speaking, there was a signifi cant 
difference between the perceptions of high caste people, 
many of whom denied that there was any signifi cant 
discrimination left against Dalits in their communities, 
and Dalits, who felt that despite some major changes, 
various forms of discrimination still existed. Dalits felt 
that there had been a signifi cant reduction in caste dis-
crimination in the public sphere (e.g., while fetching 
water, participating in community festivals, admission 
to school, inclusion in local administrative and political 
structures, visiting temples, etc.) but that there had been 
hardly any change in the private sphere (i.e., eating or 
sitting together inside each others’ houses). 
Generally speaking, the practice of pollution/un-
touchability had decreased in public places (sarbajanik 
thau) in the fi eldwork areas. Observation showed that 
both Dalits and non-Dalits participated in public meet-
ings or met for discussions in local tea shops. However, 
it was possible to identify Dalits and non-Dalits as they 
often sat in their own groups. As young Dalit man in 
Dang put it, “We had some money from VDC to do 
something. So, last week we had a Dalit awareness pro-
gramme in the village. People from high caste came and 
gave wonderful speeches. They said this ‘thulo jati’ (high 
caste) and ‘sano jati’ (low caste) are all ‘purano soch’ (old 
thinking), we are in new Nepal, etc. But, when the pro-
gramme was over, they sat together and had samosas. 
They didn’t eat with us.” He added, “That is exactly 
what I call ‘bahunbad’ (Brahmanism).” The situation was 
different when they travelled outside of their villages 
where both Dalits and non-Dalits were seen sitting and 
eating together. 
Thus, it was possible for Dalit men and women to 
go and drink tea or eat in restaurants/shops owned by 
higher castes. Similarly, men from higher castes often 
went and ate in shops owned by Dalits. Unlike previ-
ously, Dalit men did not have to wash their own dishes 
after use. In Doti and Dadeldhura, Dalits had begun to 
rear buffaloes and sell milk. Previously, the practice was 
forbidden as high caste people would not buy their milk. 
In the town of Silgari in Doti, Dalits could now en-
ter the temple of the goddess Shaileshwari, which was 
forbidden previously. Though this practice was resisted 
by the high caste and a strong sense of resentment was 
present among high castes in the town, strong local Dalit 
activism supported by NGOs had sustained this change. 
Abandoning traditional practices
Dalits throughout the fi eldwork areas had begun to 
abandon many practices associated with patronage based 
on caste. A few high caste men and women said that 
they did not discriminate against Dalits because of their 
caste but made comments that Dalits lacked cleanli-
ness and culture. They often took the example of Sarkis 
(leather workers) who ate sino (meat of an animal who 
has died from illness or natural causes). As a response to 
such comments and allegations, Sarkis had abandoned 
the practice of eating sino. 
In Doti and Dadeldhura, Dalits had stopped carrying 
the dolis of non-Dalits. Traditionally, Dalits used to carry 
the bride and groom in a locally-built basket known as 
doli. In Palpa, Dalits had stopped respecting the bali ghare 
system which required Sarkis (leather workers), Damais 
(tailors), Kamis (iron workers) and Gaines (singers) to 
provide services for upper caste people in their villages 
and in return receive grains and gifts on an annual ba-
sis. Bali ghare were not paid on the basis of their daily 
or hourly service. In many ways, feudal attitudes and 
practices had been challenged. A Dalit man in Rupan-
dehi said that previously landowners exploited them. He 
added, “They didn’t like us wearing good clothes. If they 
saw you wearing good clothes, they would call you and 
make you to carry bricks. They were very bad. All these 
days are gone now; the old man is dead.” However, such 
change was not seen among Mushaharis (Terai Dalits) 
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and asked us to approach other women in her village. 
She said, “People like me do not understand these things 
(ma yesto kura bujhdina), you should ask other women 
who understand these things (kura bujhne mahila).”  An-
other woman continued, “….they go to meetings, they 
go to cities, they do a lot of different things, they say 
women’s rights....I never went to school…my fate is to 
carry fodder and fi rewood.”  According to them, there 
were two types of women in their village, i.e., those who 
understand (kura bujhne) and those who do not under-
stand (kura naujhne). 
Very generally speaking, men we met opined that dis-
crimination against women was still a problem in their 
communities, but felt that things had changed consider-
ably in the last 15-20 years. 
Throughout the fi eldwork areas, there was a general 
agreement that both formal and informal education 
(commonly referred to as sikcha) had played an impor-
tant role in increasing awareness (commonly referred to 
as chetna) on the issue of poor representation and par-
ticipation of women in society. Rama, a middle-aged 
Bahun woman who took part in NGO activities in Palpa 
said, “Women are now educated, (their) level of aware-
ness in society has increased signifi cantly...it is because 
of education (sikcha)….the situation has changed a lot. 
These days women are not passive; they come out to 
take part in meetings and groups.”  When we asked her 
how the situation had changed, she replied, “It is edu-
cation (sikcha), radio keeps telling not to discriminate 
against girl children…in our village you won’t fi nd a 
single girl child who does not go to school…we or-
ganised various meetings, went door to door.…people 
from outside come (NGO workers) and gave us train-
ing (talim haru)….as you are probably aware women are 
treated equally in other countries; isn’t it?”
The activities (meetings, educational programs, and 
trainings) of NGOs and CBOs played an important role 
in creating public awareness and pushing the issue of 
gender balance and representation at the community 
level. “NGOs bring various programmes to empower 
women; some bring programmes on saving groups 
(bachat samuha) other bring programmes on mothers’ 
groups (ama samuha) and forest groups (ban samuha)….
they give education and teach us,” said a Dalit woman 
in Kailali. A Dalit woman who was infected with HIV 
said, “Sir and madam came (NGO workers), formed this 
group (a local network of people living with HIV) and 
taught us many things….I have learned many things, I 
have been to several meetings…I went to Kathmandu 
once.”  She added, “Our men are irresponsible, they 
bring back HIV to the village from India and trans-
mit to us....very few women can force their husbands 
to use condoms or go for blood test…we are educating 
women on this.” 
and some Tharus in the Terai who continued to work in 
feudal conditions for their “owners,” i.e., landlords.
There was a feeling among the high castes that 
things were changing and they were losing control and 
power over Dalits. As a response, a few high caste men 
and women made sarcastic remarks against lower caste 
people for their active agency in challenging upper caste 
dominance and activism in the last eight to ten years. 
“These days we have to be extremely conscious of what 
we say; people are looking for opportunities. They are 
very reactive,” commented a Chettri man in Doti. 
We will return in our concluding section to the 
question of whether these changes constitute funda-
mental and substantial shifts in relationships between 
groups and the structural violence affecting these rela-
tionships, or should be read more as important changes 
in the spheres of ritual and symbolism.
Women’s position
There was a common perception among both men 
and women that gender-based discrimination had de-
creased signifi cantly in the last 10-15 years. Women we 
spoke to felt that things had changed considerably for 
them. Several women spoke with enthusiasm of the 
changes that had taken place in their lives. These could 
be categorized in the following three themes: 
• recognition of discrimination against women
• direct changes in women’s lives
• changes in women’s participation in social and po-
litical life
Recognition of discrimination against women
Both men and women throughout the fi eldwork ar-
eas felt that discrimination against women was an im-
portant issue in their communities. Women across dif-
ferent socio-economic and cultural groups had become 
increasingly “aware” of gender-based discrimination 
against women and women’s rights in recent years. This 
sense of awareness was very high among women who 
had had access to schooling and those who took part in 
various social and political activities in the communities 
in the form of public meetings organized by NGOs, 
government, and political parties. Several women in 
the fi eldwork areas introduced themselves as volunteers 
(swayam sewika), facilitators (sahajkarta), or community 
mobilizers (samudaik parichalak) working for NGOs. 
However, most women in the fi eldwork areas had very 
limited opportunity to take part in these various socio-
political activities and had very low levels of awareness 
of their rights. When we asked a Chettri woman (ap-
proximately 45 years old) in Doti if she knew about 
women’s rights, she told us that she was not educated 
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schooling practices among younger women and vari-
ous literacy and Non-Formal Education (NFE) classes 
had impacted on women’s confi dence and self-esteem 
considerably. 
As indicated earlier, women frequently felt that they 
had become “aware” of their rights and many other 
social and community level issues. Women mentioned 
that previously they lacked awareness on nutrition, 
maternal and child health, importance of savings, and 
education, among others. 
One of the most visible changes in the last two de-
cades was that an increasing number of girls went to 
school. Both women and men felt that this was a sig-
nifi cant change in their communities. It was common 
to see girls going to school. As a result, socio-econom-
ic conditions had improved: some girls had begun to 
take up salaried employment within the village or in 
a nearby town. 
Increased confi dence and self-esteem among wom-
en had resulted in women participating in various cam-
paigns against major problems (almost always against 
men) in their communities. These included campaigns 
against domestic violence and against the sale of alco-
hol and playing cards, among others. 
There was a shared understanding in the fi eldwork 
areas that women could no longer be discriminated 
against, as society had become politicized and the issue 
of women’s rights had become a public issue. The cases 
of domestic violence and neglect of women within the 
households had decreased signifi cantly as a result of 
different factors. There were examples in Palpa, Doti, 
and Bhindungwa of women collectively dealing with 
incidents of domestic violence and intervening on be-
half of abused women and/or reporting the issue to 
police with the support of NGOs. The presence and 
moral support of NGOs were critical in these events. 
While we could not get any clear example of the Mao-
ists’ role in challenging domestic violence, we were 
often told that “Maoists would punish in public men 
who beat their wives.” 
In Palpa and Doti, local women’s groups had played 
a signifi cant role in the banning of the uncontrolled 
sale and public abuse of alcohol. We were told that 
women often spilled the liquor and put restrictions on 
the production of alcohol. Women involved in these 
activities claimed that domestic violence had decreased 
considerably. Informants said that there was a strong 
support from the Maoists for this kind of activity. 
Another related activity was women taking a collec-
tive role in stopping gambling (playing cards) among 
men. Typically, a group of 15-20 women would enter 
the gambling venue, burning the cards and giving a 
warning to the men. Alongside women, Maoists were 
NGOs and CBOs throughout the fi eldwork areas 
ran various activities and campaigns to tackle gender-
based discrimination. Informants opined that radio 
programs (particularly FM radio) played an important 
role in public awareness on the issue. Similarly, a few 
informants felt that many young men and women who 
went to the cities for further education and employ-
ment opportunities brought ideas of women’s rights 
in their villages. Increasingly, the debate on women’s 
backwardness formed a regular topic of discussion in 
tea shops (among men) and water taps (among wom-
en) in the fi eldwork areas. 
Changes in women’s lives
“Women used to cover their head with ghungat (a shawl) 
but now women wear revealing clothes showing their navel. 
They react aggressively when men tease them.”
-A middle-aged Dalit man in Rupandehi
There was a widespread perception (among men and 
women) that women’s lives have changed considerably 
in the last 15 years. This included increased confi dence 
among women, awareness of their rights, increased 
freedom to participate in community activities, in-
creased decision-making power, improved health, in-
creased participation in labor, and reduced incidents of 
domestic violence, among others. 
During the fi eldwork, women articulated their 
right to be treated equally; they spoke about the dis-
crimination faced by women in Nepal and argued that 
women ought to be treated equally. A young Dalit girl 
(aged 20) who worked as a clerk in a government of-
fi ce in Morang said, “Women have long been discrimi-
nated against and we are still treated as second class 
citizens (doshro darja ko nagarik)….but the situation 
is changing; women are getting educated.” Increased 
awareness of their rights had led women to speak up. 
NGOs and CBOs played an important role in teach-
ing women their rights. Despite a heightened sense of 
discrimination, women did not always feel comfort-
able talking about discrimination faced by them when 
they were alone. Women did, however, speak openly 
and often with radical tones, about the discrimination 
by the state, society, and their households in meetings 
and group discussions. Space for collective meetings 
created by NGOs and CBOs provided women with a 
sense of agency. 
NGOs’/CBOs’ social mobilization activities in the 
form of group work enabled women to strengthen 
their confi dence and social skills. For instance, a Tharu 
woman in Morang found it extremely diffi cult to talk 
about the situation of women in her village when our 
local fi eld assistant (female) attempted to interview her. 
However, she spoke openly in the discussions when 
she was a part of the group. Similarly, women felt that 
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Changes in women’s participation
and organization
As indicated above, there was a signifi cant change in 
women’s participation in various social and political ac-
tivities in the last decade or so. It was possible to observe 
meetings of mother’s groups and saving groups. In a vil-
lage in Morang, we met a group of 30 women who had 
gathered at nine in the morning for their monthly saving 
meeting. All the women (married and mostly between 
the ages of 20-40) were able to take time out of their 
household chores to take part in this activity for not less 
than two hours. All the women members came together 
to make savings and selected women took credit for var-
ious income-generating activities. We could see women 
participants holding money (up to NRs 500) in the 
meeting. The meeting involved calculating the savings 
made by the group and working collectively to ensure 
repayment of the loans. Towards the end of the meeting, 
women collectively read the “prayer” (prathana) written 
on the back of their savings booklet, which stated their 
commitment to work as a collective for saving and social 
development. Though these women were able to come 
for these meetings, their responsibilities at home had 
not changed. These women went back to their homes 
after the meeting and cooked food. In Rupandhi and 
Kailai, several women were seen travelling out of their 
village to take part in the meetings organized by NGOs 
on issues of women’s empowerment, forestry, saving 
and credit, among others. However, women’s increased 
participation in the public sphere does not necessarily 
indicate that women’s position within the households 
had improved.
Women had begun to migrate to study and in search 
of work opportunities. Women who migrated to work 
in the Gulf were seen as being “from troubled back-
grounds.” Women who went to gain education and who 
could get good jobs were respected. 
Informants said that previously women’s representa-
tion was minimal and almost non-existent. In the last 10-
15 years, women were increasingly represented in local 
committees and decision-making structures at the local 
level, i.e., representation in VDC, user’s groups, health 
post advisory committee, school governing boards, etc. 
Informants in the fi eldwork areas opined that women’s 
representation in these committees was considered man-
datory and important. Participation in these activities 
had resulted in some women’s agency increasing consid-
erably. There was increased leadership of women in the 
village-level committees. Many men felt that women 
ought to be given representation, and put forward their 
argument using the language of women’s rights. It was 
also possible to meet women in the fi eldwork areas who 
were activists for different political parties. 
Despite impressive changes in women’s participation 
active in stopping gambling. The Maoists’ usual tactics 
to stop gambling included forcing the players to eat 
their cards and declaring non-gambling zones. In one 
case in Palpa, a young Maoist destroyed the motorcycle 
of one of the gamblers by burning it.
Traditional practices like the chaupadi system have 
been reduced to a large extent in Doti and Dadeld-
hura districts. In the chaupadi system, women were 
considered polluted and were required to sleep in the 
cowshed (or a similar hut known as chaupadi) during 
menstruation and at childbirth. This change has been 
largely attributed to the work of NGOs and CBOs. 
Informants said that international NGOs like the Lu-
theran World Federation (LWF) were running various 
public awareness campaigns in Doti. 
The concept of pollution had changed. In the fi eld-
work areas, women were allowed to give birth in the 
house rather than in the cowshed. Though most par-
ticipants acknowledged that some form of pollution 
was still observed. For example, during menstruation, 
women have to stay in a separate room and observe 
pollution while eating. Education was cited as the most 
important driver of change in this regard. But educa-
tion had not necessarily led to abandonment of ob-
servation of pollution. In Rolpa, an NGO aid worker 
explained that there was more resistance from higher 
caste families to these changes. He gave the example 
of a group of female Chettri teachers who had pooled 
together the money to build a clean room they could 
retreat to during menstruation. The implication was 
that at home they were still forced to respect chaupadi.
While there has been some impressive increase in 
women’s wages in recent years (e.g., from NRs 70 to 
NRs 120 in Kailali), the wage differential between 
men and women was a regular feature throughout the 
fi eldwork areas. In this sense, there had been very lit-
tle change on the wage difference between men and 
women. 
Generally, it was believed that women’s health had 
improved considerably throughout the fi eldwork areas. 
Despite this, it was possible to see several undernour-
ished women throughout the fi eldwork areas. Except 
for a few cases in Rupandehi, Kailali, and Morang, 
child marriage was not common. It was widely be-
lieved that child marriage and early pregnancy had an 
adverse impact on women’s health. 
Generally speaking, women’s household and farm-
related work burden had increased dramatically because 
male members had migrated in search of work oppor-
tunities. For many women who lived separately from 
their in-laws, on the other hand, the absence of men in 
the households enabled them to take part in women’s 
groups and various informal education programs. 
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responsibility. In the absence of their husbands, women 
faced social pressure to prove that they remained faith-
ful to their husbands. Women’s movements and daily life 
were often closely watched by neighbors and relatives.
The formation of women’s groups was considered a 
major change in the communities. Informants in these 
areas said that previously women did not come to take 
part in community meetings. Formation of groups 
meant that women had become active, took part in the 
meetings, and asked questions. In Palpa, we were able 
to observe a meeting of a dairy user’s group; there were 
about 15 men and eight women who were participating 
in the monthly meeting of the dairy committee. Col-
lectively women (who sat together) were vocal in the 
meeting and questioned the decisions made by the core 
group dominated by men. After their monthly meet-
ing, we asked the women what they thought about the 
women’s situation in their village. Before women could 
reply, a man replied to the question, saying that discrimi-
nation against women had decreased in recent years. He 
said, “Women are no longer discriminated against; these 
days women have got rights. Things have changed con-
siderably.” A woman angrily reacted to his comments, 
“How can you say so? How do you know? You can’t 
say anything just like that; you should ask us….What 
and representation in various public activities, traditional 
roles in terms of household chores had not transformed. 
One young married woman in Dang commented, “The 
only change is that we have been told that we too have 
rights. In our daily life, we continue to cook, look after 
children and wash.”  She added, “We talk about equality 
but men’s attitude has not changed. My neighbour picks 
his wife’s petticoat (drying in the sun) using sticks but 
not using his hand.” It was almost impossible for us to 
organize interviews and groups discussions with women 
in the evenings. Men would say that women would not 
be able to come to meetings, as it was time for them to 
cook. Public places like village tea shops were still oc-
cupied by village men. 
In Rolpa, a group of women were meeting in the 
yard of a village house. When asked what had changed 
in their lives, they said that they were still poor but 
now they were “aware.” When asked to give examples 
of what that meant practically, one woman quipped: “It 
means that if my husband beats me, I know I have the 
right to beat him back!”
Out-migration of men had left many women alone at 
home, looking after children. This had no doubt provid-
ed them with more “agency” but it also meant increased 
A group of women gather in their saving and credit group meeting in a village in Morang
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There was a common perception throughout the 
fi eldwork areas that the landlords and other upper class 
people had lost some of their authority during the con-
fl ict period. Comparatively, this was more visible in the 
hill villages (Doti, Dadeldhura, Rolpa, Dang, and Palpa) 
than in the Terai (Kailali, Rupandehi, and Morang). Fol-
lowing the Maoist insurgency, most upper class people 
had left the village (voluntarily or by force) and mi-
grated to nearby towns or Kathmandu. In the areas 
where Maoists had a strong presence (e.g., in the vil-
lages in Rolpa, Doti, Dang, Rupandehi), several land-
lords had completely abandoned their property while 
in other areas (e.g., in Palpa) upper class people had left 
their property to someone they trusted in the village 
(usually a relative) and became absentee landlords. After 
joining mainstream politics, the Maoists had begun to 
return land that belonged to landlords in areas where 
their infl uence was less strong. In this sense, there was no 
long-term effect on land distribution as a result of Mao-
ists capturing property/land. However, the situation in 
Maoist strongholds like Dang was different: a signifi cant 
number of Maoists (and those calling themselves “free 
Kamaiyas”) had captured land belonging to absentee 
landlords and, more recently, forest land belonging to 
the state and were still holding on to it. 
With the popularity and growth of the Maoists’ in-
fl uence, land holding had become a problem for the 
land-owning class. Landowners perceived that the Mao-
ist government would either take their property away or 
signifi cantly reduce the size of land ceilings. As a result, 
the landowners were making every effort to sell their 
agricultural land or reduce the size of land holdings. It 
was households with migrant remittances from the Gulf 
(and to some extent from India) who bought land from 
landowners. There was a clear sign of land distribution/
fragmentation as a result of remittance fl ow into the vil-
lages. This process enabled the land-owning households 
to buy small pieces of land in the nearby cities or in 
Kathmandu and eventually shift their residence there. 
Further, one of the signifi cant changes in the house-
hold economy was the rapid growth of non-farm econ-
omy in the fi eldwork areas. Thus, land was not always an 
important symbol of class in the villages; rather it was 
money (mostly gained through remittances and wage 
labor), a secure job, and education that were increasingly 
considered important symbols of status in the villages. 
Schooling and education were perceived as the most 
important routes to social mobility, though people were 
aware that schooling and education did not automati-
cally mean social mobility. People were aware that social 
networks were very important to get jobs and thereby 
ensure cash infl ows into the household. The opening of 
roads and market access had facilitated improvement in 
the economic situation of a few households. As a re-
sult, some peasant households had turned entrepreneurs 
do you know about us?” Following this, all the other 
women echoed her. Women’s participation in the public 
sphere had strengthened their confi dence to raise their 
questions. 
During the fi eldwork, we were not able to meet 
women who had participated in the PLA.8 However, we 
met a few women in Palpa, Rolpa, Doti, and Rupandehi 
who supported the Maoists; they were young women 
who had been to school. They said that women’s in-
volvement in the Maoist movement had challenged 
gender-based discrimination signifi cantly. A young mar-
ried woman in Dang who was otherwise critical of the 
Maoists opined that some of the actions of the Maoists 
had given more confi dence to women. She said, “Many 
women now walk around with AK 47. We have to re-
member that previously they were not allowed to go out 
of their house. This leads to a ‘mental change’.” This view 
was not always shared by others for whom there was no 
connection between women’s empowerment and the 
Maoist movement. They felt that the Maoists had done 
nothing apart from recruiting Maoists to fi ght and pun-
ishing a few men for drinking and playing cards. 
Economic relations
“Previously zamindars (landlords) ruled, we had to 
consult them for everything (looks towards his father for 
approval). Now we can do what we want, isn’t it? Now 
they have left; you can go and see their house; it’s all re-
duced to rubble.” This young man in Dang was referring 
to three landlords who owned 50 bigha9 of land and who 
had left the village following the confl ict. When asked 
what had happened to their property, including the land, 
he replied, “Their relatives are looking after the house, 
landless people cultivate some land....I don’t know what 
will happen now? I hear that the land will be returned 
to them.” What his young man told us in Dang largely 
refl ects the situation of landlords and captured land in 
rural Nepal. 
We aimed to explore people’s perception of transfor-
mation in the economic and power structures and the 
drivers of change in the fi eldwork areas. While the re-
spondents came from different class backgrounds, most 
of them were rural peasants and laboring households. 
Rich landlords from the villages had migrated to nearby 
cities or to Kathmandu in search of protection. 
8 However, we have met many women who actively partici-
pated in the Maoist insurgency as a part of another Tufts/
FIC research project. We will discuss the experiences of 
women who took part in the armed movement in another 
report.
9 1 bigha is equal to 8,316.8 square meters.
July 2010 • Towards a “Great Transformation”?
19
work as priests as the profession had been challenged by 
Dalits and ethnic activists and ridiculed in recent years. 
As indicated above, employment within security sector 
(police and army) had decreased considerably, due to the 
threat from the Maoists. Thus, in many ways, traditional 
livelihood strategies throughout the fi eldwork areas had 
undergone profound transformations.
Very generally speaking, there was a consensus among 
informants that the consumption of manufactured goods 
and wage labor among poorer households had increased 
considerably in recent years. However, poorer house-
holds felt that it was becoming diffi cult to manage daily 
livelihoods in the face of price increases. For the house-
holds relying on day labor (e.g., Mushahars in Morang), 
the pressure seemed acute and they had begun to make 
signifi cant reductions in their diet (mostly one meal a 
day); hunger and malnutrition among men, women, and 
children was clearly visible. Generally, the situation of 
poor peasants and day laborer households that did not 
have family members working abroad was severe. Those 
households who were excluded from opportunities of 
migration were missing out on its benefi ts. ■
(e.g., selling milk, vegetables, or fruits in local markets), 
successfully improving their socio-economic situation. 
To some extent, this process undermined the traditional 
authority of the land-owning class. This was evident 
in all the fi eldwork areas. Similarly, absentee landlords 
meant that poorer household did not have to live under 
the traditional authority of the zamindars.
Traditional occupations among untouchable occupa-
tional castes (Damai, Sarki, Kami, etc.) were diminishing. 
For instance, except for one or two people, Damais were 
not working as tailors, Kamis were not seen making 
agricultural and household tools, and Sarkis were not 
seen making leather shoes and other leather products. 
People found it cheaper and easier (and fashionable) to 
buy ready-made Chinese clothes. Markets were full of 
cheap plastic and aluminium utensils. Shoes and bags of 
different designs and colors were readily available. Simi-
larly, with the popularity and spread of Dalit movements, 
there was a general push to abandon traditional occupa-
tions, which were believed to be based on the Hindu 
system of hierarchy. Likewise, very few Bahuns were seen 
working as priests; the young Bahuns did not want to 
A young man works in the land with plough in a village in Dang
Je
ev
an
 R
aj
 S
ha
rm
a
Feinstein International Center
20
The Nature of Social Transformation 
When we embarked on this study, we had as-sumed that by analyzing the “views from below” it would be possible to determine 
whether there was a “before” and “after” to the Maoist 
insurgency. We had assumed that because the insurgency, 
at its core, addressed the issues of rights, discrimination, 
and state and development failure, it would be relative-
ly easy to document a causal relationship between the 
Maoist agenda and change in rural Nepal. It turns out 
that things are not so simple. Clearly, the confl ict and the 
agency of the Maoists have had an impact. In some ways, 
the Maoists were an accelerator of change, an important 
vector of transformation. But they were not the only 
one and their relationship with the other vectors is dif-
fi cult to unscramble.
One of the fi rst conclusions, therefore, that can be 
drawn from this research is that alongside the political 
transformation, largely attributed to the Maoists, the 
people who took part in the study felt that that there 
has been a remarkable set of social and cultural changes 
in their communities in the past decade which had little 
to do with the Maoist presence and agenda. 
It seems to us that the Nepali state is going through 
a qualitative “step-change” in the way society is orga-
nized that is beyond the continual or “normal” processes 
of incremental social change that are always at work in 
any society. The state is going through a transformative 
phase in which many existing social norms and patterns 
are being challenged and many are being reconstructed. 
The process of current transition is leading towards ma-
jor shifts in dominant political, economic, and socio-
cultural relationships. The Maoists have contributed to 
this process in a signifi cant way, but there were, and are, 
other factors at play.
The two most important forms of transformation we 
identify are: increased awareness and education and in-
creased collective agency of discriminated groups. Peo-
ple we spoke to repeatedly emphasised that “they had 
become aware” and their “sense of confi dence and self-
esteem had increased considerably.” People had gone 
through an internal process of transformation from “not 
knowing” to ”knowing” and from “lack of confi dence” 
to “increased collective agency to raise their concerns 
and rights.” There was evidence of changes in caste, gen-
der, and power relations at varying degrees at the lo-
cal level. Perhaps the most important “step-change” was 
seen in the caste domain, where there has been signifi -
cant reduction in discriminatory practices, more evident 
in the public than in the private sphere. Women’s collec-
tive agency had equally increased. 
Alongside the politicization of ethnicity, which had 
been a key component of the Maoist agenda, there was 
a sense that local people were increasingly aware of their 
ethnicity and had begun to take part in various ethnic 
mobilizations at the local level, although people did not 
speak directly about affi rmation of ethnic identity as a 
form of social transformation. Despite the heated schol-
arly and popular debate on federal state structure, af-
fi rmative action, ethnicity-based political mobilizations, 
and ongoing politics of representation in contemporary 
Nepal, people we spoke to at the local level did not 
view this issue as a form of social transformation. How-
ever, we do maintain that this is likely to change in the 
next few years with the mass politicization of ethnicity 
associated with growth and expansion of organizations 
and networks. 
However, while it was clear that there had been ma-
jor changes in the representation of and participation 
in the social sphere, our evidence suggests that there 
was no remarkable change in “class” relations and in 
the structural underdevelopment of Nepal’s rural areas. 
Even if migrant remittances during and after the confl ict 
period had enabled some households to improve their 
socio-economic position in the community, the condi-
tions of structural violence affecting the majority of the 
rural poor do not seem to have changed substantially. 
It was thus almost impossible to fi nd clear evidence of 
“step-changes” in people’s standard of living as a result 
of the transformations that have occurred. 
More research is no doubt required better to un-
derstand the nature of change. For now, our provisional 
conclusion is that in the rural areas there has been sig-
nifi cant symbolic change but little substantive change. 
Symbolic change itself needs to be nuanced: it has af-
fected relations among groups in the public sphere 
(caste, gender, and other forms of discrimination, social 
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of conscientization and empowerment. The approach 
was group-based and was proactive rather than reactive. 
NGOs focussed on working directly with the marginal-
ized and oppressed groups and not with the institutions, 
individuals, or groups who were responsible for the dis-
crimination. 
Therefore, the occupation of political space at the 
macro level (largely created by the Maoists) and local 
social space (largely created by the NGOs and CBOs 
and to some extent by the Maoists) together seem to 
have been instrumental in bringing about the transfor-
mation that has occurred. It is too early to say convinc-
ingly whether this transformation is durable or not. Our 
sense is that there is probably no “going back” on issues 
of awareness of rights and the more symbolic/ritualis-
tic aspects of caste discrimination. It is far from clear, 
however, whether the structural determinants of socio-
economic livelihoods in rural Nepal have been deeply 
affected. The feudal/caste system may well have been 
affected in its external manifestations, but as yet there 
has been no “revolution” in power and class relations 
nor in the manner in which rural Nepalis eke out their 
livelihoods.
What emerges nonetheless is an interesting relation-
ship between education and awareness-raising on the 
one hand, and the Maoist insurgency and the role of aid 
agencies and NGOs on the other, in bringing about so-
cial transformation. The politicization of women, caste, 
and power relations may be the unexpected result of 
successful development programs that aimed to “em-
power” women, landless Kamaiyas, and Dalits by raising 
their consciousness of gender-, class-, and caste-based 
oppression issues. Even if the conscientization activities 
of civil society organizations had to some extent pre-
pared the terrain, it is unlikely that the level and the 
pace of such changes would have been possible in the 
absence of the Maoist insurgency. The Maoists, by their 
example of taking up arms, provided the political space 
for change to actually happen. The paradox here is that 
the Maoist discourse was built, at least in part, around 
the narrative of “failed development” as a justifi cation 
for armed struggle while the NGOs were actually an 
example of “development success” in articulating a very 
similar agenda but from a very different perspective.10 
The fact that the Maoists and civil society organiza-
tions were essentially competing on the same terrain 
rituals, etc.), less so in the private sphere.  
There has also been change in the “opening-up” of 
remote areas to ideas, communication, and markets as 
a result of road construction, migration, remittances, 
and the penetration of media and telecommunications. 
Such global processes are undoubtedly affecting the lives 
of rural families in important ways. So far, however, it 
would seem that while caste has changed, class has not. 
In this sense, the concept of class and the political econ-
omy of class relations seems to be more relevant and a 
better indicator of substantive change (or lack thereof) 
than the concept of caste. This is important for future 
research and conceptualization of transformation.
What then were the drivers of change? Two fac-
tors stand out: education and conscientization. They are 
connected and diffi cult to unscramble. Education was 
perhaps seen as the most important factor in bringing 
about transformation in Nepali society. People again and 
again emphasized the role of education in making them 
“aware” and building up their confi dence. At the same 
time, conscientization, both through the political agency 
of the the Maoists and the work of aid agencies, in par-
ticular NGOs and CBOs, seems to be an important vec-
tor of social transformation (in terms of caste and gen-
der). The Maoists and the agencies operated in related 
but very different and sometimes competitive ways.
Our analysis suggests that the Maoist movement 
played an important role in two ways. First, the politi-
cal discourse and slogans used by the Maoists provided 
a political space required for the emergence and suste-
nance of a transformative process in Nepali society. This 
was useful to place the issues of representation, voice and 
equality in political and administrative structures on the 
political agenda and to achieve political legitimacy for 
transformation. Second, at the local level, Maoists tactics of 
social transformation were seen to be more reactive than 
proactive. Generally, Maoist activists did not take a pro-
active role in challenging discrimination or mobilizing 
oppressed groups; they did, however, play a reactive role, 
i.e., they were quick to intervene when cases of discrimi-
nation were reported locally. Their usual method was to 
punish the “culprit.” They focussed on “culprits” rather 
than on “victims.” However, the Maoists did carry out a 
range of political advocacy activities (in the form of vari-
ous forms of messages, public speeches, village theatres, 
cultural programs, etc.) in some areas of Nepal, which 
were aimed at promoting the agency of Dalits, women, 
landless peasants, and other marginalized groups. 
While sometimes competing around the same agen-
da of discrimination and rights, the role of NGOs and 
CBOs in promoting social transformation was differ-
ent from that of the Maoists. The NGO approach was 
based on social mobilization and community organiza-
tion, and educating local people using Freirian models 
10 On the competing narratives of development “success” and 
“failure” see Antonio Donini and Francesca Bonino, Aid 
and Violence: Development Policies and Confl ict in Nepal, Fein-
stein International Center, Tufts University, Medford, June 
2009; also Lauren G. Leve, “’Failed Development’ and Rural 
Revolution in Nepal: Rethinking Subaltern Consciousness 
and Women’s Empowerment,” Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 
80, no. 1 (2007): 127-172.
Feinstein International Center
22
poor, families receiving remittances are better off, and 
in some cases can access land that traditional zamindars 
have abandoned. An overall land reform remains a dis-
tant aspiration. However, the combination (and some-
times the competition) of the political agency of the 
Maoists and social development work of civil society 
organizations, in parallel with the development of for-
mal and non- formal education, has resulted in a histori-
cal transformation of consciousness. Awareness of rights 
and gender has increased massively, the collective agency 
of women and oppressed and marginalized groups has 
escalated and has probably resulted in durable changes 
in how individuals, groups, and institutions interrelate. 
However, the “revolution,” such as it is, has yet to make 
a serious dent in the structural violence that continues 
to characterize life in rural Nepal. 
Moreover, what we are starting to see is a growing 
disconnect between aspirations and realities. In the ab-
sence of structural changes in the lives and livelihoods 
of people on the ground, especially if the current stale-
mate continues at the central political level, this gap is 
likely to grow further. Disconnect coupled with disillu-
sionment could well lead to more “morbid symptoms” 
in the transition process, and potentially even violence. 
Thus, understanding evolving perceptions on the na-
ture of change would seem to be not only an exciting 
ethnographic experience, but also one with immediate 
policy implications for decision-makers, whether Ne-
pali or outsiders. For our part, at Tufts/FIC, we plan to 
continue to remain engaged on these issues, including 
through further fi eldwork on social change and trans-
formation. ■
of rights and empowerment explains the frictions and 
misunderstandings that occurred on the ground. The 
Maoists viewed the NGOs with hostility—particularly 
US-based NGOs—at least initially and only came to 
an accommodation with them over time. The tensions, 
misunderstandings, and intersections between these 
somewhat parallel but very different processes deserve 
further study.
On the structural side of the transformation equa-
tion, change has been less substantive. The Maoist in-
surgency led to the displacement of many upper class 
landlords and to the stagnation in land prices in rural 
areas. This, and the perceived threat of the imposition of 
a land ceiling, made it possible for migrant households 
(households with migrant workers who sent remittanc-
es) to buy land and assert power. In some areas of Mid-
western Nepal, with the support of the Maoists, landless 
Kamaiyas have begun to squat in government forest land 
and have captured the land of the absentee landlords. 
As well, the rapid expansion of road-networks, markets, 
state services, increased mobility/migration, media, and 
telecommunication has integrated the hill economy and 
society into various social and economic processes as-
sociated with forces of modernization and globalization. 
In addition, the rural population have been exposed to 
the ideas of modernity and development through vari-
ous modernizing projects that continue to transform the 
consciousness of the population, if not structural reali-
ties, on the ground. 
In sum, the political economy of survival in rural 
Nepal has not changed dramatically. There has been no 
revolution at the level of livelihoods. The poor remain 
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Larger Meanings: from Social
Reproduction to Social Transformation?
There are many ways of conceptualizing the cur-rent period of post-confl ict uncertainty and transition in contemporary Nepal. Our fi ndings 
prompt us to view the transition as a Gramscian “inter-
regnum”11 between the known past and the uncertain 
future as a complex passage from forms of social orga-
nization based on reproduction—of the types and na-
ture of livelihoods, power relations, cultural norms, and 
values—to new emerging and transformative forms of 
livelihoods, power, and culture.
Change is not uniform, but it is happening. The con-
fl ict and the Maoist agenda seem to have functioned 
as an accelerator of change, certainly in terms of the 
“awareness” of the issues of structural violence that is 
attributed by many to the agency of the Maoists and to 
some extent of the NGOs. These issues are now clearly 
in the minds of people and have been acted upon, at 
least symbolically, through the activities of the Maoists 
themselves but also much more broadly in the social 
conscience. This is expressed in many ways—including 
the denial by high caste people that there is any discrim-
ination based on caste and, conversely, in the widespread 
perception among Bahun and Chettri communities that 
they are suffering from reverse discrimination. 
In the anthropological and development scholarly 
literature on Nepal, there has been a strong tendency 
until recently to view life in the hills of Nepal largely as 
11 “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dy-
ing and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a 
great variety of morbid symptoms appear,” Antonio Gram-
sci, Quaderni del carcere, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 
ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith 
(Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 276.
Cart is loaded with rice to be sold in the nearby market in a village in Morang
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nence of the interregnum metaphor and of the “morbid 
symptoms” that describe the current situation.
We are struck, however, by the fact that the three 
indicators of the transition from “reproduction” to 
“transformation” that Polanyi identifi ed in the 1940s 
resonate with the current situation in Nepal.16 These 
are the commodifi cation of land, labor, and money. Po-
lanyi, of course, was writing about the transformation of 
pre-industrial Europe, but his insights are analogous and 
relevant to contemporary transformations in the Third 
World.17 Our fi ndings point to the increasingly rapid in-
corporation of rural Nepal, including its remotest areas, 
into the market economy. Wage labor is becoming more 
frequent as is the production of cash crops. Land is in-
creasingly bought and sold and no longer seen just as the 
place where one grows one’s food. Remittances have 
further boosted the commodifi cation of money within 
a market economy—as confi rmed by the immediate 
opening of a Western Union outlet even in the remotest 
areas as soon as the telecom network reaches there.
It remains to be seen whether the commodifi cation 
of key factors of production and the transformation that 
accompanies it will be benefi cial to the rural poor in 
Nepal. Evidence of globalization is everywhere in the 
middle hills. But the question that arises is whether the 
increasing “marketization” of rural Nepal will make a 
difference in terms of the conditions of structural vio-
lence that characterize these hitherto marginal or “for-
gotten” areas. And whether the changes will be essentially 
positive or negative. As in other countries in or recover-
ing from confl ict—Afghanistan and Somalia come to 
mind—the incorporation of previously ungoverned or 
poorly governed spaces into the globalized economy is 
fraught with tensions and contradictions. All the more 
so when expectations, as in Nepal, are extremely high. 
A re-reading of Polanyi is useful because it reminds 
us that the tools that allowed the great transformation to 
take off in Britain and in the West—protectionism and 
state intervention in the regulation of markets—are be-
ing denied to the countries emerging from crisis today.18 
a discrete and timeless society unaffected by the outside 
world.12 To some degree, there was a romanticization of 
life in a kind of Shangri-la kingdom in the mountains. 
More precisely, there was a “sedentary bias,” i.e., an over-
whelming focus on the village and local cultural practic-
es as main units of research.13 Furthermore, while recent 
studies clearly focus on the importance of mobility in so-
cial change and people’s livelihoods, as well as on the dy-
namic relations between the traditional and the modern, 
these studies often view such inside-outside dynamics as 
peripheral variables to the understanding of local situa-
tions and provide little insights into evolving economic 
frameworks and their socio-cultural dimensions. 
The concept of social transformation “implies a fun-
damental change in the way society is organized that 
goes beyond the continual processes of social change 
that are always at work.”14 Undoubtedly, such a trans-
formation is at work in Nepal. What is happening in 
the middle hills and in the Terai is not a linear transi-
tion from “reproduction” to “transformation.” Change 
had started before the war, particularly in the Terai, but 
also in the hills (because of migration to the Terai and 
abroad, remittances, some development of education and 
health services, improved agricultural practices, the slow 
emergence of cash crops as alternatives to subsistence 
agriculture, presence of development agencies, and so 
on). Some “awareness-raising” activities had also started 
before the war.15 Not all areas visited displayed the same 
qualitative changes. The process of change in Nepal, as 
everywhere, is dictated by context and is confusing, un-
even, and fraught with backlashes. It is dialectical in the 
sense that forces and counter-forces are at play. It does 
not necessarily lead to a new synthesis. Hence the perti-
12 See literature review in Antonio Donini and Francesca 
Bonino, Aid and Violence: Development Policies and Confl ict 
in Nepal, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 
Medford, MA, June 2009.
13  L. H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and Na-
tional Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago 
and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1995). J. 
R. Sharma, “Practices of Male Labor Migration from the 
Hills of Nepal to India in Development Discourses: Which 
Pathology?” Gender, Technology and Development 12, no. 3 
(2008): 303-323.
14 S. Castles, “Understanding Global Migration:  A Social 
Transformation Perspective” (Conference on Theories of 
Migration and Social Change, Oxford, IMI, 2008), 11.
15 In our fi eldwork, we came across several older villagers 
who had fond memories of Peace Corps volunteers who 
“lived in our village and even spoke our language.” The 
same applies to NGOs who pioneered non-formal educa-
tion projects for women before the war.
16 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 
2001), particularly chapter six.
17 F. Stewart, “Do we need a new ‘Great Transformation’? Is 
one likely?” (QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS136, 
Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House, February 2006).
18 C. Cramer, C., (2006), Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing. Ac-
counting for Violence in Developing Countries (London, Hurst 
& Company, 2006). F. Stewart, ed., Horizontal inequalities 
and confl ict: understanding group violence in multiethnic 
societies (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
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Nepali “borderlands,” like their Somali or Afghan coun-
terparts, have any prospect of “catching up” or even of 
infl uencing the course the global processes that are af-
fecting them. Indeed, it may be prudent to hypothesize 
that what is in store for Nepal is a continuing, if not 
permanent, transition. 
Our study points to a rapidly emerging fl ashpoint 
here: if the odds are stacked against climbing the ladder 
(or developing a new one), if transformation in rural 
Nepal is more about the symbolic and the “awareness” 
aspects of social relationships and less about the struc-
tural dimensions of the human condition, the perceived 
disconnect between aspirations and reality is bound to 
escalate, with potentially serious consequences. Further 
work to understand the implications of this disconnect 
is necessary and urgent.
Today’s industrialized countries were able to defi ne the 
parameters that allowed them to “develop.” They then 
set the standards for others to be incorporated in the 
northern modernizing (and civilizing) narrative. 
The combination of structural inequalities in North-
South relations and the imposition of northern stan-
dards and processes of globalization, or “network pow-
er,”19 creates a vise from which countries in transition 
like Nepal cannot escape. This is tantamount to “kick-
ing away the ladder” to development.20 The lateness of 
the transition makes the ladder even more diffi cult to 
climb. There may well be “transformation” in the rural 
areas of Nepal, but not necessarily “modernization,” i.e., 
a transformative structural development process that is 
broadly benefi cial to the livelihoods and rights of the 
populations concerned.21 There is no evidence that the 
19 “Network power” refers to the global dominance of stan-
dards that have achieved critical mass in language, technol-
ogy, trade, law, and in many other areas. The dominance of 
a successful standard involves a form of power. Thus, while 
these new standards allow for global coordination, they also 
eclipse local standards, incompatible with dominant ones. 
Therefore, many of the choices driving globalization are 
only formally free because the network power of a domi-
nant approach makes it the only effectively available op-
tion. As such, it refl ects a new imperialism. See D. Grewal, 
Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization (New 
Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2008).
20 Cramer, 230.
21 On the distinctions between development and “modern-
ization,” see Mark Duffi eld, “Development, territories and 
people: consolidating the external sovereign frontier,” Alter-
natives 32, no. 2 (2007): 225–246.
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Annex I: Fieldwork Sites Details
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